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Abstract
In this paper, we use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to analyze the
impact of protection on total and per unit profits in the U.S. and other major trading
countries. It is found that protection reduces profits in the export sectors more than it
stimulates profits in the import-competing sectors. However, total profits of export and
import-competing firms combined are generally unaffected by existing tariffs.
Furthermore, most of the profit transfers between exporters and import-competing firms
take place within the same industry rather than across industries. Therefore, general
tariff measures are not likely to enhance profits of U.S. industries. Only tariffs aimed at
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Even though the dollar has depreciated significantly since the winter of 1985,
the United States has continued to run a substantial trade deficit. The trade imbalance
has fueled protectionist sentiment especially in the U.S. Congress, and numerous proposals
have been made to impose trade restrictions as a means of inducing surplus countries to
institute market opening measures that might benefit American suppliers. Such
restrictions may also be favored in the belief that protection can help generally to restore
the profitability of U.S. industries that have been battered by the effects of the
appreciation of the dollar prior to 1985.
The belief that protection will increase profits is surprising to many economists
who have long argued that protection does not help all producers in an economy. That is,
protection may shelter import-competing firms from foreign competition but only at the
expense of export firms. While this simple theoretical point seems obvious, it is
remarkable that it is so often overlooked or else deemed irrelevant. In a recent essay,
Clements and Sjaastad (1984) have forcefully reacted against ignoring the impact of
protection on exporters. Using the argument that every tariff is ultimately an export tax,
they compute the tax incidence of protection in Australia and six developing nations and
conclude that, in most cases, tariffs tax exporters much more than they subsidize import-
competing firms. They conclude (p. 49) that, "given this information, it can no longer be
credibly argued that protection serves the national interest."
In this paper, we address the same question as Clements and Sjaastad in the
context of the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. Not only does the Michigan
Model include a wider set of countries, but it also allows a theoretically more complete
analysis of this issue. In Section II which follows, we consider some conceptual points
concerning the impact of tariffs on profits. We then briefly discuss the Michigan model,
our methods of analysis, and the numerical experiments. Subsequently, we present the
results of our experiments for the United States and compare them with the other
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countries of the model.
II. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TARIFFS ON PROFITS
In this paper, profits are defined as the share of revenue that is not paid out to
labor or intermediate inputs but accrues to capital instead. The impact of tariff protection
on profits depends on the response of a firm's revenue and costs to a change in tariffs. A
tariff makes imports more expensive and therefore causes a shift in demand away from
imports towards relatively cheaper domestic substitutes. Increasing demand leads to
higher prices for domestic products, so that production of goods for domestic consumption,
which we will call home goods, becomes more profitable. Producers of home goods and, in
particular, import-competing firms earn more profits. At the same time, however, all
industries face higher production costs. Imported and domestically produced intermediate
products have become more expensive and, if wages are linked to the domestic price level,
labor costs go up as well. As a result, part of the profit gain of home-goods producers is
neutralized by rising costs.
While import-competing sectors benefit rom protection, exporters are
unambiguously worse off. Under competitive conditions, export prices are determined in
international markets by the equality between world demand and supply. As tariffs
reduce import demand, they put downward pressure on world prices. Moreover, like all
firms, exporters in the country with the tariff protection pay more for their inputs. They
therefore face lower output prices as well as higher costs, and this reduces both their level
of output and profits. Furthermore, exporters in other countries are hurt by the declining
world demand and lower world prices. The thrust of Clements and Sjaastad's argument is
that protection hurts export profits substantially more than it helps import-competing
firms. In support of this contention, they compute a measure of profitability per unit of
output in export and import-competing firms. In their view, a tariff alters the difference
between the product price and the unit costs of a firm, and, in this respect, works exactly




subsidy for import-competing domestic industries. Consequently, the impact of a tariff is
best measured by the magnitude of the subsidy it provides and the export tax it imposes,
or, what amounts to the same thing, by the change in the profitability per unit of output in
export and import-competing firms.
In their empirical work, Clements and Sjaastad define the change in
profitability of export industries as the difference between the percentage change in the
export price and an appropriately constructed price index of nontraded goods. In the same
way, the response of profits to tariff protection in import-competing industries is the
difference between the price changes of home goods and nontraded goods. Clements and
Sjaastad consider price changes in nontraded goods as a good proxy for unit cost
adjustments. They argue that nontraded goods consist mainly of services, which are
supposedly more labor intensive than other products. The prices of nontraded goods are
therefore primarily determined by wage costs. Given the importance of labor in production
costs and the assumed similarity between wages and the prices of nontraded goods, the
change in price of nontraded goods is thus supposedly a good approximation for cost
changes in the economy.
In our view, Clements and Sjaastad's approach can be faulted on at least
three counts. First, in concentrating on wages and labor costs, they ignore the role of
intermediate inputs in total costs. But more importantly, it is not necessarily the case that
nontraded goods are more labor intensive than tradables. Table 1 presents data on labor
compensation as a fraction of value added for selected countries in 1976. With the
exception of community, social and personal services (ISIC 9), labor costs in nontraded
industries do not systematically account for a larger share of value added than in tradable
industries. Hence, we see no valid reason for using a price index of nontraded goods as a
measure of unit costs. A final point is that, in assessing the effects of tariff protection, it
may be misleading to focus on profit per unit of output rather than total profits. The
change in profit per unit of output equals the change in the price minus the change in
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average cost. If protection induces large average cost but small price adjustments,
profitability per unit of output may fall in import-competing industries even though total
profits may have risen considerably. For the same reason, export profits per unit of
output may go up while total export profits fall. In order to overcome these objections, we
shall use the Michigan Model to analyze the effects of protection on both total and unit
profits for the major industrialized and developing countries.
III. PROTECTION AND PROFITS IN THE MICHIGAN MODEL
As indicated in Deardorff and Stern (1986), the Michigan Model is a general
equilibrium model of the world economy with 34 countries and 29 industries. There are 22
sectors producing tradable goods, which are both exported and consumed domestically.
The products of the other seven sectors are not traded internationally and are only
consumed at home. In the tradable industries, the Michigan Model makes an explicit
distinction between production for export and production for domestic consumption. Each
industry uses labor, intermediate inputs, and fixed amounts of capital to produce profit-
maximizing levels of output for each purpose. In this set-up, profits are equal to the
return to the fixed factor, capital, or, equivalently, to the share of revenue that is not paid
to labor and intermediate inputs. This is the definition of profits used in all the
computations to follow. We consider two experiments. First, we compute the
consequences of a complete removal of all existing post-Tokyo Round (1987) U.S. tariffs on
profits of exporters and producers of home goods. The second experiment is similar, but
we assume that all industrialized countries agree to dismantle their post-Tokyo Round
tariff barriers as well. 1 Both experiments are thus comparing total and per unit profits
1We assume in both experiments that existing nontariff barriers (NTBs) are not
removed. As noted in Deardorff and Stern (1986, p. 22), the treatment of NTBs in the
Michigan Model reduces the responses to tariff liberalization. Since we do not have
systematic estimates of the price and quantity effects of NTBs, trade coverage ratios based
on the UNCTAD inventory of NTBs are used to represent NTBs, which are assumed to
remain in place.
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in a situation with and without tariffs and, in this way, provide information about the
effects that the current levels of protection may have on profits.
The post-Tokyo Round tariff rates for the industries and industrialized
countries covered by the Michigan Model are listed in Deardorff and Stern ( 1986, p. 51 ).
In most countries, tariffs range from 4 to 7 percent, although in Australia, Austria, and
Finland they are substantially higher. In general, the textile, wearing apparel, and
footwear industries are among the most heavily protected.
IV. PROTECTION AND PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES
The first experiment provides an indication of the impact of the current levels
of U.S. post-Tokyo Round tariffs on profits. For this experiment, the U.S. tariffs are
removed and we calculate the percentage profit changes that would result. We then take
these profit changes, with their signs reversed, as an indication of what the effects would
be of imposing the existing U.S. tariff structure on the economy without tariff barriers.
The results are reported in Table 2. For each U.S. industry the table contains profit
figures for export and import-competing firms as well as an aggregate for all firms in the
industry combined. The first three columns show percentage changes in profits per unit of
output, and the last three refer to percentage changes in total profits. Tariffs increase
production costs and, in reducing import demand, lower world prices. Hence export firms
experience both higher costs and lower prices so that all profit changes in the fourth
column are negative. The changes in export profits per unit of output in column (1) depend
on the strength of the price and average cost adjustments and can be positive or negative.
The second and fifth columns contain the profit adjustments in firms producing for the
domestic market. Tariffs increase demand for import-competing goods, and, unless input
costs increase drastically, total profits of firms producing for the domestic market increase.
For this reason, all figures in column (5) are positive except for the profit changes in the
paper and nonferrous metals industries. The per unit profit changes for import-competing
firms in column (2) are positive for all industries except wearing apparel, footwear, and
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petroleum products. The profit levels in the nontraded sectors are virtually unaffected by
the tariff removal. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 show the change in total industry
profits for exporters and home-goods producers combined.
Table 3 presents the same information as Table 2 for our second experiment
involving the post-Tokyo Round tariffs for all the industrialized countries of the model. In
this case, imported inputs and consumption goods are more costly in all industrialized
countries, which reinforces the demand shift away from imports. As a result, world trade
declines, but this does not necessarily imply that U.S. export firms lose more from
multilateral tariffs than from the U.S. tariffs. If foreign suppliers experience greatly
reduced exports due to existing tariffs, the changes in world prices can be relatively small,
which would limit the profit declines of U.S. exporters.
In both tables, we also computed profit changes for the whole economy as a
weighted average of the industry results. The appropriate weights were found by first




with n = number of industries in the economy.
Logarithmically differentiating this identity gives:
7r.
n 1
dln = E - dlnr.
i =1 II 1
Hence, the shares of a sector's profits in total profits can be used as weighting factors to
construct the averages for columns (4) - (6) of each table. As should be evident, the profit
shares used are not the same for export, import-competing and all firms combined.
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with Y = total national output
By definition:
n
Y = E Y.
i=1 1




dln Y= E - dln Y.
i=1Y 1
The definition of profit per unit of output may include all firms in the industry or apply to
export or import-competing firms only.
From the aggregate profit figures for the whole economy, we conclude that
current U.S. tariffs reduce total export profits by 5.3% and increase profits in the home
goods sector by 0.1%. As seen in Table 3, multilateral tariffs yield similar results,
although the reductions in total export profits are generally larger. Our results thus
suggest that, if tariffs were increased, exporters are harmed more than import competing
firms are helped by existing tariffs. While this is consistent with the findings of Clements
and Sjaastad, it is important to note that, when the profits of exporters and home-goods
producers are combined, the total industry profits are virtually unaffected by existing
tariffs. The reason is that exports account for only a small fraction of total production in
most U.S. industries, as is indicated in Table 4. Apparently, the burden that U.S. tariffs
impose on exporters provides a relatively insignificant subsidy to a relatively large import-
competing sector. It thus appears that, while protection does not impose an important
burden on total industry profits, it seriously hurts exporters and does not significantly help
import-competing firms.
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In our experiments, average cost changes are an increasing function of output
changes because both average intermediate cost and average labor cost increase when
output expands. As a result, unit profits fall less than total profits in export firms with
reduced production. This is seen by comparing columns (1) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3. For
the same reason, unit profits increase less in import-competing firms where the tariffs
cause increases in production ( compare columns (3) and (5) ). The positive relation
between average cost and output changes also explains why the difference between total
and unit profits is most marked in industries with substantial changes in total profits. In
effect, the large reductions in total export profits in several industries are accompanied by
increasing profit margins. This brings into question the use of unit profits as a valid
indicator of profit changes. It furthermore suggests that Clements and Sjaastad
underestimate the true cost of protection for export firms, although the methodological
problems mentioned earlier make their results hard to interpret.
The sectoral results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that import-competing firms in
the wearing apparel, leather, footwear, electrical machinery, transport equipment, and
other manufactured products industries benefit most from protection, although the gain in
total profits never rises above 2%. At the same time, export profits in several of these
industries would rise substantially if tariff barriers were removed. Thus, protection
generates a transfer from exporters to other producers within the same industry.2
Whether profits of the whole industry decline depends on the export shares in sectoral
production and on the unilateral or multilateral character of the tariffs. We find that, with
protection, total profits are lower in the transport equipment and leather industries and
higher in the wearing apparel, other manufactured products, and footwear industries.
Reducing tariffs would raise export profits in sectors such as agriculture and electrical
machinery without any significant negative impact on home production. These industries
2The Michigan Model distinguishes export firms from import-competing firms. In
reality, the shift from import-competing to export activities may take place within the
same firm.
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are the real victims of protection.
V. AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TARIFF PROTECTION AND
PROFITS
In this section, we compare the impact of multilateral tariffs on per unit and
total profits in different countries. Table 5 presents the percentage changes in profits of the
export and home goods sectors for all countries of the model, as well as the change in
profits for both sectors combined. The results reported represent national averages for all
industries. As mentioned before, the profit shares of individual industries in national
profits were used as weights.
For most countries, a similar picture emerges as in the case of the United
States. In percentage terms, tariffs would reduce total export profits more than they
increase total profits of import-competing sectors. Reductions in total profits in export
production are in the 4-12% range for most countries, while increases in profits in the
home sector are most often under 2%. Furthermore, total profits of the home and export
sectors combined would generally fall, but the changes would be minimal.
Looking at individual countries, we find that exporters in Australia (-12.5%),
Austria (-16.1%), Canada (- 10.3%), and Taiwan (- 14.9%) are most affected by existing
tariffs. The result for Australia and Austria is easy to explain in view of these countries'
relatively high levels of protection. The relatively large total export profit changes in
Taiwan and in South Korea (- 7.9%) are more surprising. Apparently, Taiwanese and
South Korean exporters would benefit significantly from the higher world prices resulting
from trade liberalization in the industrialized countries. In addition, home-sector profits
would rise considerably in these two countries. Tariff liberalization in the industrialized
countries would thus make the Taiwanese and South Korean economies significantly more
export oriented.
Profit adjustments of some importance also occur in import-competing




characterized by high import-demand elasticities and by a large share of imports in total
demand. As a result, even low levels of protection generate a strong expansion of demand
for domestic products.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to
calculate the impact of the existing structure of tariff protection on industry profits in a
wide range of countries. We found no evidence for the belief that protection could
strengthen the profitability of U.S. manufacturing industries. Profits of the import-
competing sectors are only marginally enhanced by the current levels of tariff protection
and profits of export and import-competing firms combined are generally unaffected by
existing tariffs. Considering furthermore that trade barriers hurt consumers, the
justification for new tariffs on profitability grounds appears rather weak.
Our experiments confirm Clements and Sjaastad's finding that the existing
tariff protection taxes exporters much more than it subsidizes the import-competing sector.
In several U.S. industries the loss in export profits is quite large. Also, trade barriers
significantly reduce export profits in most other countries.
At a more detailed industry level our results indicate that, at least in the
United States, most of the profit transfers between exporters and import-competing firms
take place within the same industry rather than across industries. This is particularly the
case in industries such as textiles, footwear, and wearing apparel, where pressure for
protectionist legislation traditionally has been strong. It suggests that broad tariff
measures will generally not succeed in raising profits in hard pressed industries. Only
tariffs aimed at specific product groups may have this effect.
16
REFERENCES
Clements, K.W. and L.A. Sjaastad. How Protection Taxes Exporters. Thames Essays
no. 39, Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 1984.
Deardorff, A.V. and R.M. Stern. The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.
Cambridge : MIT Press, 1986.
TABLE 1 : LABOR COMPENSATION AS A PERCENTAGE SHARE
OF VALUE ADDED IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1976
Sector ISIC group France Germany U.K. U.S. Japan Brazil
1. Tradable industries . . . . . . . .
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing (1) 18.4 13.7 36.2 18.8 14.0 16.9
Food, beverages, and tobacco . . . . . (310) 47.4 29.2 22.3 48.3 30.0 22.2
Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (321) 76.0 49.1 59.0 81.3 66.1 34.7
Wearing apparel . . . . . . . . . . . . (322) 86.0 65.8 75.7 88.4 72.6 34.4
Leather and leather products . . . . . (323) 81.3 53.7 54.6 87.2 65.2 37.0
Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (324) 82.7 58.1 64.3 85.9 67.9 35.7
Wood products . . . . . . . . . . . . . (331) 58.2 44.8 66.0 61.7 61.6 36.1
Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (332) 76.8 66.1 82.5 79.2 64.8 47.2
Paper and paper products . . . . . . (341) 65.8 39.3 59.4 70.4 45.3 34.2
Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . (342) 77.6 53.7 73.4 79.4 66.2 40.8
Chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (35A) 51.3 52.4 57.7 56.1 36.2 19.4
Petroleum products . . . . . . . . . . (35B) 40.8 18.2 16.6 42.7 8.8 58.9
Rubber products . . . . . . . . . . . . (355) 54.1 54.0 74.2 63.2 62.4 22.4
Nonmetallic mineral products . . . . . (36A) 65.2 73.5 86.8 66.5 48.0 32.2
Glass and glass products . . . . . . . (362) 68.3 76.4 88.4 69.2 51.1 34.8
Iron and steel basic industries . . . . (371) 72.7 65.0 83.9 77.4 33.6 25.9
Nonferrous metals . . . . . . . . . . . (372) 71.0 64.1 82.6 74.1 42.6 29.3
Metal products, except machinery . . . (381) 73.3 63.5 78.0 74.1 54.6 37.4
Nonelectrical machinery . . . . . . . . (382) 67.5 65.7 78.5 76.0 50.3 41.7
Electrical machinery and apparatus (383) 76.0 75.9 68.4 81.1 46.0 35.2
Transport equipment . . . . . . . . . . (384) 67.6 66.8 80.9 71.3 52.1 34.2
Other manufactured products . . . . . . (38A) 43.4 46.6 57.8 47.9 30.5 30.8
Average traded goods . . . . . . . 54.4 52.7 57.3 62.1 39.4 25.3
2.Nontradable sectors . . . . . . . . .
Mining and quarrying . . . . . . . . . (2) 31.1 32.3 50.5 33.2 45.4 33.5
Electricity, gas and water . . . . . . (4) 27.7 25.6 40.4 27.7 31.2 24.1
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5) 79.0 55.9 64.4 79.0 55.0 48.7
Wholesale and retail trade . . . . . . (6) 57.7 45.1 59.5 57.9 49.8 24.2
Transport and communication . . . . . . (7) 60.5 59.7 64.4 60.5 64.1 44.1
Finance, insurance, real estate . . . . (8) 29.5 31.5 20.3 29.5 21.2 47.6
Community, social and personal services (9) 89.7 72.1 89.7 89.7 68.0 59.4
Average Nontraded Goods . . . . . . 66.7 59.4 67.1 63.7 52.9 40.5
Source : Data base for the Michigan model.
TABLE 2 : EFFECTS OF POST-TOKYO ROUND U.S. TARIFFS ON PROFITS PER UNIT OF OUTPUT
AND TOTAL PROFITS BY INDUSTRY
Percentages
Percentage change in profits





Export competing All Export competing All
firms firms firms firms firms firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.Tradable industries . . . . . . .
Agriculture, forestry, fishing
Food, beverages, and tobacco . . .
Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wearing apparel . . . . . . . . . .
Leather and leather products . . .
Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wood products . . . . . . . . . . .
Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paper and paper products . . . . .
Printing and publishing . . . . . .
Chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Petroleum products . . . . . . . .
Rubber products . . . . . . . . . .
Nonmetallic mineral products . . .
Glass and glass products . . . . .
Iron and steel basic industries . .
Nonferrous metals . . . . . . . . .
Metal products, except machinery
Nonelectrical machinery . . . . . .
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Transport equipment . . . . . . . .










































































































































































2.Nontradable sectors . . . . . . . . .
Mining and quarrying . . . . . . . . .
Electricity, gas and water . . . . . .
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wholesale and retail trade . . . . . .
Transport and communication . . . . . .
Finance, insurance, real estate . . . .
Community, social and personal services






















-1.3 0.0 -5.3 0.1 0.0
I I i
(a) See text for construction of the weighted average.
TABLE 3 : EFFECTS OF POST-TOKYO ROUND TARIFFS OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES





Percentage change in profits





Export competing All Export competing All
firms firms firms firms firms firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.Tradable industries . . . . . . . . .
Agriculture, forestry, fishing . . . .
Food, beverages, and tobacco . . . . .
Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wearing apparel . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leather and leather products . . . . .
Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wood products . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paper and paper products . . . . . . .
Printing and publishing . . . . . . . .
Chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Petroleum products . . . . . . . . . .
Rubber products . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nonmetallic mineral products . . . . .
Glass and glass products . . .
Iron and steel basic industries . . . .
Nonferrous metals . . . . . . . . . . .
Metal products, except machinery . . .
Nonelectrical machinery . . . . . . . .
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Transport equipment . . . . . . . . . .
Other manufactured products . . . . . .
2.Nontradable sectors . . . . . . . . .
Mining and quarrying . . . . . . . . .
Electricity, gas and water . . . . . .
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wholesale and retail trade . . . . . .
Transport and communication . . . . . .
Finance, insurance, real estate . . . .
Community, social and personal services



































































































































































































(a) See text for construction of the weighted average.
TABLE 4 : PERCENTAGE SHARES OF EXPORTS IN TOTAL U.S. PRODUCTION, 1976
Export shares in
Sector ISIC group total sectoral production
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing (1) 13.2
Food, beverages, and tobacco . . . . . (310) 2.5
Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (321) 8.0
Wearing apparel . . . . . . - . -. . . (322) 1.8
Leather and leather products . . . . . (323) 32.3
Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (324) 10.0
Wood products . . . . . . . . . . . . . (331) 9.5
Furniture...-.. . . . . . . . . . . . (332) 2.1
Paper and paper products . . . . . . . (341) 5.0
Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . (342) 1.4
Chemicals...... ...-. ....... .. (35A) 10.5
Petroleum products . . . . . . . . . . (35B) 5.0
Rubber products . . . . . . . . . . . . (355) 5.5
Nonmetallic mineral products . . . . . (36A) 3.9
Glass and glass products . . . . . . . (362) 6.0
Iron and steel basic industries . . . . (371) 2.7
Nonferrous metals . . . . . . . . . . . (372) 4.3
Metal products, except machinery . . . (381) 3.9
Nonelectrical machinery . . . . . . . . (382) 19.4
Electrical machinery and apparatus (383) 10.8
Transport equipment . . . . . . . . . . (384) 14.4
Other manufactured products . . . . . . (38A) 17.4
Source : Data base for the Michigan model.
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TABLE 5: CHANGES IN PROFITS PER UNIT OF OUTPUT AND TOTAL PROFITS
DUE TO POST-TOKYO ROUND TARIFFS IN ALL INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF THE MICHIGAN MODEL
( Percentages
Percentage change in profits Percentage cha
per unit of output In total profi
Import Import
Export competing All Export competing
firms firms firms firms firms
1.Industrialized Nations
Australia . . . . . . . 0.7 -0.4 0.2 -12.5 0.8
Austria . . . . . . . . 0.2 -0.7 -0.2 -16.1 1.6
Belgium-Luxembourg . . . -3.1 0.4 0.0 -7.3 1.5
Canada . . . . . . . . . -5.7 0.0 0.1 -10.3 0.3
Denmark . . . . . . . . -3.8 -0.5 -0.8 -9.8 0.6
Finland . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.1 0.4 -7.2 0.9
France . . . . . . . . . -2.9 0.1 -0.1 -8.3 0.6
Germany . . . . . . . . -4.1 0.1 -0.3 -8.4 0.8
Ireland . . . . . . . . -1.3 1.3 0.8 -6.1 2.3
Italy . . . . . . . . . -1.9 0.3 0.3 -6.1 0.7
Japan . . . . . . . . . -4.2 0.3 0.1 -6.4 0.3
Netherlands . . . . . . -2.0 0.3 -0.2 -6.0 1.3
Norway . . . . . . . . . -3.3 -0.3 -0.3 -9.1 0.3
Sweden . . . . . . . . . -3.0 -0.3 -0.2 -7.6 0.4
Switzerland . . . . . . -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -4.5 0.2
United Kingdom . . . . . -1.8 0.5 0.5 -7.6 0.9
United States . . . . . -3.9 0.0 0.0 -7.3 0.1
2.Developing Nations .
Argentina . . . . . . . -3.4 -0.1 -0.2 -4.3 0.0
Brazil . . . . . . . . . -2.6 0.0 -0.1 -3.6 0.1
Colombia . . . . . . . . -3.8 0.2 -0.1 -4.5 0.3
Greece . . . . . . . . . -1.9 0.0 -0.1 -2.0 0.0
Hong Kong 2. . . . . . -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
India . . . . . . . . . -2.3 0.0 -0.1 -2.7 0.0
Israel . . . . . . . . . -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1
South Korea . . . . . . -4.8 1.1 0.8 -7.9 1.5
Mexico . . . . . . . . . -2.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.6 0.1
Portugal . . . . . . . . -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Singapore . . . . . . . -1.1 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 0.0
Spain . . . . . . . . . -1.9 0.0 -0.1 -2.3 0.1
Taiwan . . . . . . . . . -9.8 2.5 0.9 -14.9 3.2
Turkey . . . . . . . . . -2.5 0.0 -0.1 -2.6 0.0
Yugoslavia . . . . . . . -0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0
nge
ts
All
f irms
-0.1
-0.3
-0.2
0.0
-0.9
0.3
-0.1
-0.4
1.0
0.3
0.0
-0.3
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
0.5
0.0
-0.2
0.0
0.0
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
-0.1
0.8
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.0
W
W-
E-
0


